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time. In 1972 and 1974, there were two major debt
reorganisations involving Ghana and Indonesia (the
latter the result of the plan formulated by Hermann
Abs). These agreements were on a very long timescale
- 30 years I believe - and at concessional interest
rates. It is interesting that the lenders (primarily but
not exclusively aid agencies rather than export credit
agencies) apparently absorbed the implicit costs of
concessional interest rates without a murmur. Later in
the 1 970s as a number of African countries, 10 years or
so after independence, began to run into payment
problems - many of them the result of early economic
mismanagement as much as malign external conditions
- the practice grew up of the major creditors meeting
together regularly but informally. Nearly all of them
were members of OECD and the meetings were almost
always under French chairmanship. There were one or
two exceptions: for example, Britain chaired one of the
later Ghana debt conferences, and the negotiations
with Turkey, itself an OECD member, took place
there rather than in the strictly Paris Club format.
Many of these negotiations still centred on old aid
loans, although the UNCTAD resolution 165 of 1979
recommended the progressive conversion of such
loans into grant - the process known as RTA. Partly
as a result of that, and partly as a result of the changing
pattern of indebtedness, the focus has shifted from the
early 80s onwards towards export credit debt - that
is, loans made directly, by bodies like US Exim, or
guaranteed by bodies like ECGD. Nearly all such
lending was on commercial terms (though much of it
was at slightly concessional rates, as defined by the
OECD consensus). From 1982 onwards, the major
debtors moved centre-stage, but the path had been laid
down for them by Poland, which went to a Paris Club
procedure (diplomatically given a different name) in
1981.
Since then, the sausage machine has become highly
automated, and negotiation follows a fairly standard
pattern with surprising speed. The Secretariat recently
produced some startling figures to demonstrate the
scale of these operations. In 1987 alone, the total
volume of payments rescheduled amounted to $26 bn.
Even if you subtract Poland and Yugoslavia, we re-
scheduled $18 bn of debt of 15 developing countries.
That is $2 bn more than the total gross disbursements
of the World Bank (including IDA) and of the IMF. It
represents an enormous contribution to easing the
Origins and Evolution
It will be helpful to start with an institutional account
of the Paris Club, because there is relatively little
written about it, and much misunderstanding. In
origin, the so-called Club goes back 34 years, to the
Argentine debt settlement of 1956. Indeed, the Club
celebrated its 30th Anniversary in 1986 with a splendid
dinner at the Banque de France. But the 1956
negotiations were very different from the present
system. The background was, of course, non-
convertibility. And the Argentine negotiations con-
cerned the speed with which blocked accounts would
be freed up. Thus the problem was essentially the
same: a lack of hard currency resources to meet
existing obligations. But the financial framework was
completely different. Some of the intellectual
approach, and indeed the language of the present-day
Paris Club agreements reflects these early origins.
Above all, it was a multilateral solution to the
problem. One of the contemporary documents on
Treasury files puts it very clearly:
It would be surprising if the Argentines abandon
their preference for bilateral discussions. Our
proposals for a roundtable conference clearly
alarmed them. They prefer to negotiate bilaterally
in the belief that the lessons learned in one
encounter may be applied to good effect in the next.
The prospect of sitting down with representatives
of high technical competence from several
countries together is not calculated to attract them
in their present situation. They are afraid of being
manoeuvred into uncomfortable positions and of
being faced with unpalatable decisions. This is, I
think, the chief reason why they counter our
proposals with plausible arguments that the
disparate nature of their debts and the dissimilar
preoccupations of their creditors make a joint
examination of this problem impracticable.
The pattern which was established for Argentina in
1956 has served the financial community well ever
since, and I think the debtors now accept that.
During the 1970s, the pattern of multilateral
government debt negotiations became relatively
standardised. But there was a significant shift over
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immediate cashflow problems of the debtors. And it
only involved 17 meetings, each one or two days long,
plus a few informal technical meetings among the
creditors. Contrast this with the weeks spent by the
banks on each case.
Main Features of a Paris Club Agreement
How does the Paris Club operate? Perhaps the easiest
way to understand it, and the rationale behind it, is to
analyse the main features of an Agreed Minute - the
formal process-verbale which records the decisions of
a meeting. Inform, this is simply a recommendation to
creditor governments by their representatives meeting
in Paris informally under French chairmanship. To
give legal force to these recommendations, they have
to be translated into a series of binding bilateral
agreements. Those signed by the UK, though not all
the others, actually take the form of international
treaties registered at the United Nations. Many others
are simply an 'exchange of letters'.
The Agreed Minute begins with a recital of the
countries and international organisations attending
the meeting, and of the fact that they listened to a
presentation by the debtor of his serious financial
position. The formal and slightly stilted language
conceals an important truth: that the creditors meet
with the debtor under the shadow of a threat of
imminent default, in order to provide a tidy and
mutually-acceptable solution rather than an untidy
and acrimonious default. This criterion of 'imminent
default' goes right back to the Argentine agreement
(and indeed, probably to pre-war days). The same
paragraph solemnly takes note of the determined
efforts being made by the debtor to put his house in
order. This too has long-standing historical ante-
cedents. But its purpose, these days, is to provide a peg
on which to hang a reference to an IMF-àpproved
adjustment programme.
The Agreed Minute then proceeds to define the debt
covered by the agreement. In practice this is very
important. First of all, it almost invariably excludes
short-term debt. This means that export credit
agencies can go on providing short-term cover, secure
in the knowledge that this at least will be serviced and
turned over freely. The debtor country is able to go on
financing part of his imports, including vital food and
spare parts, on ordinary commercial credit terms
without having to put up immediate front-end cash.
The major exception to this rule was Nigeria, who
built up enormous short-term arrears in 1983 which
subsequently had to be rescheduled - in effect,
capitalised and spread over the medium-term. It is a
precedent we are very anxious to avoid repeating. So
the debts which are covered by the agreement are
medium and long-term, a mixture of some old aid
loans (if not covered by RTA already) and a lot of
export credit. Inter-governmental loans other than aid
are very rarely included, though I can think of a few
cases. Very often, these debts are sub-divided into
arrears built up on recent maturities; new maturities;
and arrears or new maturities of previously
rescheduled debt (known in the trade as PRD). All
those are defined in relation to contracts entered into
not later than a certain date, known as the 'cut-off'
date. This too has an important strategic significance,
much insisted on by the IMF. The theory is that if a
debtor country is forced to reschedule a second or
third time, the cut-off date will not be moved - i.e.
credit agencies can go on lending to the debtor even
after rescheduling, once again secure in the knowledge
that such new loans will be exempted from further
rescheduling. In fact, ECGD introduced a new facility
in 1985, the so-called DX facility, specifically to cover
such cases, and the Chancellor made rather a virtue of
it at the Interim Committee meeting of October 1985.
Having defined the debt to be covered, the minute goes
on to set out the proportion to be rescheduled -
ideally, about 85 per cent of principal and no interest,
but often, in practice for the poorest countries, loo per
cent of both. (I should note at this point that while the
banks do not reschedule interest, the Paris Club does.
Such rescheduling is sometimes the financial equivalent
of the 'new money' increasingly rarely being provided
by the banks. More usually the banks continue to
receive their interest, while the government creditors
reschedule part or all of theirs, thus increasing their
exposure both absolutely and relative to the banks.)
Then the minute goes on to set out the terms of such
rescheduling - the grace period, the new repayment
schedule, and the timetable for meeting the down
payments if any (i.e. the 15 per cent or so which is not
to be rescheduled, but which is often spread out over
12 or 18 months). Then the minute specifies that such
rescheduled loans shall carry interest at 'the
appropriate market rate', to be determined bilaterally.
After that, it requires the debtor to seek comparable
terms from other creditor governments, and from
other institutions (mainly banks, but sometimes also
commercial creditors; this was particularly important
in the case of Nigeria).
The minute does not specifically say that debt due to
the international institutions will be excluded, but
there is a tacit understanding that this is so. I imagine
the reasons for this exclusion are well understood: it is
essentially because the IMF was seen as a revolving
fund, whose resources must be preserved and if
necessary refinanced from other sources. The IBRD
sees it as in the interests of its borrowers that it should
continue to obtain the finest possible terms for its own
market borrowing, which in turn means that it must be
exempted from rescheduling.
The next section of the Agreed Minute deals with
conditionality, in a rather back-handed way. It
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provides that the agreement continues to have force,
so long as the debtor country has an arrangement with
the IMF 'in the upper credit tranches' - i.e. a standby
agreement. The wording has now been modified to
cover SAF and ESAF agreements as well. This clause
contains a bit of a nuclear deterrent in as much as, ¡fan
IMF agreement lapses we cannot actually afford to
invoke the clause, because that would be to push the
debtor country back into technical default. It is the
whole object of the Paris Club procedure to avoid that.
I return to this point in a moment. Then there are some
technical provisions to ensure that the different
creditor governments are all treated on an equal
footing, and that the referee - in this case, the
Secretariat - can see fair play; and often there is a
goodwill clause committing the creditors to consider
in principle a renewal of the agreement if the debt
problems continue. The whole thing is set out in rather
stilted language, in two versions, English and French.
Both are equally unreliable. It is then signed, with a
great flourish, by the Finance Minister of the debtor
country, and by all the countries round the table.
Proceedings of the Club
So much for the format of the agreement. What
actually happens? First of all, there is a good deal of
pre-cooking. We do not actually proceed to a
negotiation until an IMF programme has been
approved (though sometimes pressure of time means
that we have to rely on a telegram from Washington to
tell us that this has happened). In practice, when the
IMF staff endorses an adjustment programme, they
have to make assumptions about the amount of debt
relief which the different groups of creditors will be
prepared to offer. This is a slightly chicken and egg
situation, but we get round it by having a monthly
round up in the Paris Club of all the debtor countries
known to be in the pipeline. By the time we get to a
formal negotiation, the JMF have a pretty good idea of
how far the creditors are prepared to go. In practice, as
I shall demonstrate, the variables in the equation are
rather limited. On top of that, there is preparatory
negotiation, very informal, between the chair and
Secretariat on the one side, and the debtor government
on the other, to make sure that everybody understands
the figures and the procedure. Failure to do this has on
occasion led to an almost complete breakdown of
negotiations, with some pretty hair-raising late night
cliff-hangers.
The formal part of the proceeding begins with a
presentation by the Finance Minister of his country's
problems and of its adjustment programme. Some of
these presentations are awfully tedious. All the
creditors present should have had the details long ago,
in the form of the IMF Staff papers presented to the
Board, and the better-organised debtors circulate
prepared statements a few days before the meeting,
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often prepared by their private bank advisers. But
there is no equivalent procedure to 'reading it into the
record' in Congress, and we have to sit through the
whole recital. This is followed by short, usually
repetitive, statements by the various international
institutions. These are often in inverse ratio to their
importance. What everyone listens for, of course, is
the IMF representative. Again, these statements could
and should be provided in written form, but we have to
sit through them. This process takes up much of the
first morning, after which we move into a creditor
caucus. The IMF observer usually sits with us for this
stage.
The Secretariat prepare a 'payment capacity' table to
support this part of the discussion. Usually, this only
looks one or two years ahead; the period covered by
the consolidation. They also prepare a Tableau
Magique, with each of the main parameters of the
agreement along one axis, and the names of the
creditor countries along the other. Filling this in
automatically indicates the lowest common
denominator of agreement, and since the Club always
proceeds by consensus, one can see at a glance what
the opening offer is likely to be. The chair tries to
formulate this fairly, perhaps involving some
bargaining if one or more creditors holds out from the
consensus. Then this is put to the debtor country -
often over the lunch break on the first day. Then
follows a period of shuttle diplomacy, more or less
protracted according to the difficulty of the operation.
The chairman moves from the debtors' room at the
back of the building to the main conference room
where the creditors remain assembled. If the
proceedings are more than usually protracted, the
chairman sometimes allows time off for dinner.
Sometimes the procedure is drawn out over more than
one day, in order to give the debtor government time
to consult its authorities at home. Usually, the
creditors have plenipotentiary powers already.
Finally, settlement is reached, and the formal
documents are signed. A polite speech is made on both
sides, and appropriately these pay tribute to the
creditors' generosity. There is then a bland press
statement, which contains none of the serious material
of the negotiation. After that, the process becomes one
of bilateral negotiations, sometimes spread out over
the next six months. Notably this process puts a
considerable strain on the organising ability of an
underdeveloped African country.
Finally, it is worth noting one difference between our
procedures and those of the banks. The Paris Club
does not negotiate new-money packages (though
when it reschedules interest it does provide equivalent
relief). We try to avoid being drawn into multilateral
pledging sessions, leaving that to be organised in the
donor groups convened by the World Bank.
There are a number of points worth bringing out
about this procedure. One is the key role played by the
chair and the Secretariat - full-time officials of the
Direction du Tresor, part of the Ministry of Finance
roughly equivalent to the home and overseas finance
sides of the British Treasury. The chairman of the
Paris Club is the Directeur du Tresor himself, Jean
Claude Trichet. His immediate deputy, the Chef de
Service Internationale (in British terms a Deputy
Secretary) also spends a great deal of time and effort
on this work, as does his immediate subordinate, the
Sous-Directeur responsible for bilateral affairs and
African countries. The more important national
delegations are also headed at senior level: the
Americans, by a Deputy Assistant Secretary from the
State Department; the Canadians, by my opposite
number in the Finance Ministry there; the Germans, at
the same level from the Economics Ministry, and so
on. Note that some governments are represented by
the Foreign Ministries, others by Finance or
Economics Ministries. But they all have plenipotentiary
powers from their governments. The Export Credit
Agencies (in most countries public corporations
rather than a government department as in England)
are represented by observers. So are some central
banks. The individual creditors meet informally from
time to time, and keep in touch between meetings by
telephone and telex. The name Paris Club is not
entirely a joke. The 17 or 18 heads of delegations all
know each other pretty well by now, and are on first
name terms. We dine together for a working session
once a month. The informal contacts at and between
meetings play an important part in the way the
operation works. Most importantly, in my view, is the
fact that the whole operation is run by a single national
administration, and a highly professional one. There
are none of the problems o'ne has with an autonomous
international Secretariat trying to carve out a role for
itself. Nor, to be fair, do the French abuse their
position in favour of francophone African client
states. They exercise a genuinely neutral role, and do it
with enormous professional skill.
Some Current Issues
Let us move from this formal account to some of the
issues raised by the Paris Club's present modus
operandi. The first and most important point and
certainly the most controversial, is conditionality.
These days it is a golden rule of the Paris Club that we
will not consider rescheduling without an IMF
programme in place. There is a limited category of
countries, not currently IMF members, or newly
admitted, for which different procedures have been
evolved. I think I helped to evolve them, in the leading
case of Poland a few years ago. We were anxious to
ensure conditionality, and to make certain that
creditors were not wasting their money when they
agreed to reschedule on generous terms. But there was
no IMF to appraise the Polish economy for us, or to
suggest terms. We tried to do it for ourselves. We set
up a small task force, of the four or five major
creditors, and paid a number of visits to Warsaw for
direct contact with the different Ministries there, in an
attempt to work out a pattern. To be frank, it did not
work well. We had neither the skills, nor the
supporting staff, ofa typical IMF mission. We did not
know how to translate IMF conditionality, with which
we were reasonably familiar, into the terms of a
centrally-planned economy as Poland then was. Nor
could we grapple with the very idiosyncratic Polish
official statistics. With a sigh of relief, we handed the
job over to the IMF when Poland rejoined. We used
slightly similar tactics for Mozambique before that
country joined the IMF. The results have not been
very satisfactory. Normally, we have insisted upon a
standby agreement, though in three recent cases we
have started with an SAF. Increasingly, I think, we
shall see longer-term agreements, under the SAF and
now the ESAF, forming the basis of Paris Club
operations, possibly for coterminous lengthened
consolidation periods. We have considered, but not so
far accepted, the idea of agreements based solely on
IBRD lending, in the form of an SAL. Perhaps that
reflects the feeling of many creditors that IBRD
conditionality is not yet as tight as that of the Fund,
and there is a tendency in the Club to look at the Fund
as its main supporter.
The next point concerns our estimate of the payment
capacity of a debtor, and thus the terms of our
rescheduling. I noted that the Secretariat produced
payment capacity figures for the period covered by the
rescheduling - that is, the maturities falling due in the
first year or 18 months. They seldom attempt a longer
horizon. We all know how difficult it is to draw up
projections of payment capacity, based as they are on
forecasts of export earnings which are particularly
difficult for monocultures like many African countries,
and which involve making assumptions about the
openness ofOECD markets for their exports. It is also
extremely difficult to judge the tolerance of the local
population to continued austerity, and their willingness
to do without imports for all but essential purposes in
order to release resources for debt service. So long-
term projections are difficult to come by, and not
always worth the paper they are not yet written on.
However, I think we should look more carefully at
long-term debt maturity profiles to avoid the very
awkward bunching which we have sometimes imposed
on the debtor country. It is going to be very important
to look at the combined impact of repayments due to
the banks, to the IFIs and to the Paris Club creditors.
Another set of problems concerns the simplification of
our procedures. Look at Zaire, which has rescheduled
nine times in the last 12 years. Each consolidation was
done on slightly different terms, and several of the
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agreements have been re-rescheduled two or three
times. The result is a multiplicity of separate categories
of debt, often involving comparatively small per-
centages of percentages of percentages. There is a case
for rolling all the existing stock of debt together in one
ball, and reconsolidating the lot over a longer
timescale, to achieve a more realistic repayment
schedule. We have done something like this,
experimentally and particularly for one country -
Poland - and I hope we shall be able to do more. The
problem is to do so in ways which preserve parity of
treatment between different groups of creditors.
Another thing we ought to do is to simplify and speed
up the process of signing bilateral agreements, which
can be terribly time consuming for the debtor
governments concerned. Maybe a standardised
agreement form would help, but different national
legal systems and different institutional arrangements
among the creditor countries make that hard to
achieve. There are in fact only two main points left
open for bilateral agreement - the actual list of debts
concerned, and the 'appropriate market interest rate'
to be charged. The first has obviously to be handled
bilaterally. The second means finding a rate which
avoids a continuing loss to the Export Credit Agency
concerned - i.e. it has to cover its own cost of
funding. So far we have not found an internationally-
agreed formula to define this multilaterally in
advance. The result is to leave room for much time-
consuming bilateral negotiation afterwards, with very
small savings to the debtor at stake. Another
possibility is to revive the idea of multi-year
rescheduling agreements. (I think it was I who coined
the acronym MYRA for these, in the context of an
early Yugoslav agreement.) The early experiments
were not very successful. We were probably too
precise in trying to set down conditions in advance.
We are now looking again at procedural changes
which will allow us to give the debtor country some
assurance of continuity, while reserving the levers of
conditionality in the hands of the creditors.
Conclusions
To sum up: the international debt problem, looked at
from the viewpoint of the creditors, is primarily a
matter for the banks, and only secondarily for the
government creditors. The government creditors are
proportionately more important in Africa than in
Latin America and elsewhere. Some mechanism is
essential to ensure the orderly restructuring of
intergovernmental debt. By a series of historical
accidents, the Paris Club has evolved into that
mechanism. It is in fact an extremely efficient
instrument for the purpose, processing very large
volumes of debt with remarkable speed and lack of
friction. It can do so because it relies upon the IMF to
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enforce appropriate conditionality, to protect the
creditors' long-term interests. Its procedures may look
a bit odd, but each element has its historical and
current rationale. Some further improvements are no
doubt possible, and we are looking at them. The Club
regard themselves as a pretty hard nosed group of
debt-collectors. But they also recognise that their
operations serve an essential developmental role, by
removing one of the inhibitions to future development.
Increasingly they see their operations in that context,
and have evolved their procedures to fit.
Postscript
Since this paper was prepared, in May 1988, there have
been several new developments. The most important
was the decision of the Toronto Summit of the seven
major industrialised countries, in June that year, to
soften the terms of rescheduling applied to the very
poorest and most heavily-indebted countries. This
decision followed an initiative launched by Nigel
Lawson, when Chancellor, in April 1987. Creditors
choose from a menu of options, including cancellation
of one-third of the debt (as proposed originally by
President Mitterrand), reducing interest charges so as
to bring down the net present value by about one-
third, or rescheduling over much longer periods. So
far 13 countries, mainly in Africa, have benefited from
the new 'Toronto Terms', one of them for two years
running. Two others have been given extended
repayment periods. In another development, the Club
agreed to base rescheduling in appropriate cases on a
'Fund-monitored programme' rather than on a
conventional Stand By. (These programmes are being
developed for countries which are seeking to escape
from the Catch-22 of large arrears to the IMF which
make it impossible for the Fund to grant a normal
Stand By immediately; such countries desperately
need debt rescheduling as a precondition of recovery
yet would not qualify for it if the Club continued to
insist on a Stand By.) Finally, the Club is now paying
very close attention to 'comparability of treatment'
between government and banking creditors. As
explained, the practice of the Club in rescheduling
interest has led in many cases to a big increase in its
exposure relative to that of the banks. And at the same
time the International Financial Institutions have
tended to increase theirs. This progressive transfer of
risk from the private to the public sector has gone too
far (as the Interim Committee of the IMF noted at its
April 1989 meeting). So the Club is no longer prepared
to be treated as 'financier of last resort', it increasingly
limits its own debt relief packages to what it considers
to be its own fair share of the total burden carried by
all creditors, thus putting the responsibility upon the
banks to make their own contribution or risk facing a
default.
